We present a general equilibrium model of the new neoclassical synthesis that has the same level of generality as the Arrow-Debreu model. This involves a stochastic multi-period economy with a monetary sector and sticky commodity prices. We formulate the notion of a sticky price equilibrium where all agents form rational expectations on prices for commodities and assets, interest rates, and rationing. We present a general result showing that monetary policy imposes no restrictions whatsoever on nominal equilibrium price levels and that the set of sticky price equilibria has a dimension equal to the number of terminal date-events. Stickiness of prices implies that this indeterminacy is real.
new classical macroeconomists and real-business-cycle analysis, in which monetary policy is unimportant for real economic activity, and on the other hand, there are the sticky price models of the New Keynesian economics, in which monetary policy is central to understanding real economic activity. The integration of these two streams in the literature leads to a class of models with four central elements: intertemporal optimization, rational expectations, optimal price-setting, and costly price adjustment.
The workhorse of the new neoclassical synthesis is a simple general equilibrium model involving inflation, output, and nominal interest rates at various date-events as its main variables. Crucial in these models is the existence of imperfections in setting commodity prices, which causes them to respond with some lag to changes in market conditions. Price stickiness is then the main channel through which monetary policy affects real variables. The main objective is to study how aggregate variables like inflation and output are affected by the adoption of various alternative policies.
The aim of the current paper is to provide a formulation of the new neoclassical synthesis that has the same level of generality as the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. This involves an extension of the new neoclassical workhorse to a setting with multiple commodities, multiple heterogeneous agents having general preferences, general monetary transaction technologies, and a general approach toward price stickiness. In such an extension, households optimize intertemporally given rationally anticipated prices of commodities and assets, interest rates, and the monetary transactions technology, and whenever prices are not sticky, they do not adjust mechanically to some measure of disequilibrium, but are derived endogenously.
To achieve these objectives, we extend the Arrow-Debreu model in three ways. First, we follow Arrow (1953) and specify a setting with sequentially opening markets for commodities as opposed to the Arrow-Debreu framework with a complete set of markets for contingent commodities. Second, we follow Clower (1967) and require that all purchases and sales of commodities in spot markets are made against money. We specify a general monetary transaction technology in the spirit of Drèze and Polemarchakis (2001) . Third, we introduce a general model of price stickiness where at each date-event, the price of a commodity is either sticky or is flexible and can be adjusted. If the price of a commodity is flexible, its value will be determined by the forces of supply and demand to achieve market clearing. If the price of a commodity is sticky, it is equal to the price in the previous date-event. Thereby, its value is endogenously determined by the first predecessor date-event where the price of this commodity is flexible. Our modeling of price stickiness incorporates frequently used specifications by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) as special cases.
A particular period in the model starts with transactions on the asset markets with households trading Arrow securities and collecting dividends on their previous period's asset portfolios. Next, during the period, transactions on spot markets for commodities take place against money, and transactions with the bank occur exchanging bank loans against money. The bank loan corresponds to an obligation of the household to the bank, and money to an obligation of the bank toward the household. Contrary to the bank loan, money balances do not earn interest.
Monetary needs are determined by the monetary transactions technology and depend on commodity prices and the consumption bundles that are chosen. The bank charges interest on nominal debts, which households pay at the end of the period.
Since households hold nominal debts in the aggregate, the bank creates seignorage, which is returned to the bank's shareholders at the end of the period in the form of dividends. This modeling choice implies that we implicitly assume a Ricardian fiscal policy.
The policy of the bank involves the specification of interest rates that are set conditional on the date-event. This is in accordance with the observation in Woodford (2003) that monetary policy decision making by central banks almost everywhere means a decision about the operating target for an overnight interest rate. The reason for making the interest rate the operating target is that the alternative where the bank tries to directly control monetary aggregates has become less effective as a consequence of increases in the sophistication of the financial system.
A central feature of the new neoclassical synthesis is that monetary policy has nontrivial consequences. The key reason is the assumption that commodity prices are not continually adjusted, but remain fixed for at least short periods. Indeed, price stickiness is a well-documented empirical phenomenon. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) , for instance, report that the median duration of a price across sectors is around one year. Price stickiness can be caused by a variety of reasons, but the typical explanation follows Sheshinksi and Weiss (1977) and is based on the existence of menu costs, caused both by the real costs associated with the transmission of prices to the consumers as well as with the decision process itself.
The standard approach in the macroeconomic literature is to specify constant elasticity of substitution in utility and production functions à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . This makes it possible to derive closed-form expressions for prices that are set by producers in an environment of imperfect competition. Such an approach does not generalize to a setting with general preferences as has been argued by Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977) , who show that equilibrium price and quantity choices may fail to exist even in extremely simple cases. To keep the feature that prices are determined endogenously in equilibrium, we stick to the standard general equilibrium paradigm of competitive markets. At all date-events where the price of a commodity can be adjusted, its level is determined by the forces of supply and demand, where supply and demand are derived from fully rational intertemporally optimizing agents.
If a commodity price is sticky, its value is inherited from the predecessor date-event and is ultimately determined by the most recent predecessor date-event where its price is flexible. If a commodity price is sticky, it is typically not market clearing, resulting in excess supply or excess demand. If the price of a commodity is sticky, its market is equilibrated by quantity adjustments, where the long side of the market is rationed by the amount of trade desired by the short side. Here, we follow the modeling approach developed by Drèze (1975) in the context of a general equilibrium model with upper and lower bounds on prices.
We formulate the concept of a sticky price equilibrium. At a sticky price equilibrium, all households optimize given rational expectations. More precisely, at a sticky price equilibrium, all households hold common and correct point expectations of all prices, rationing, interest rates, and dividends conditional on all possible date-events. Prices and rationing schemes are determined endogenously by the requirement of market clearing on commodity markets and asset markets, where sticky prices are set equal to the previous period's value. Allocations of commodities, assets, and money follow from optimizing behavior by the households, subject to the constraints imposed by the monetary transaction technology.
Our goal is to demonstrate the existence of a sticky price equilibrium under general assumptions on initial endowments, preferences, transaction technologies, and price stickiness. In an ad hoc macroeconomic model, Sargent and Wallace (1975) developed the insight that the price level is indeterminate under an interest rate rule. In a fully articulated macroeconomic model, similar indeterminacy results have been derived by Woodford (1994) . These insights have spurred an extensive literature debating the indeterminacy of equilibrium in macroeconomic models with Ricardian fiscal policy, see Woodford (2003) for a detailed treatment of this literature and Cochrane (2011) for a recent discussion. Beyond equilibrium existence, we are therefore interested in obtaining an indeterminacy of equilibrium result in our general setting.
For each terminal date-event, we select one commodity with a flexible price and set this price equal to an arbitrary value. Next, we prove that each such specification of prices is consistent with some sticky price equilibrium, which demonstrates that sticky price equilibria exist and that the set of sticky price equilibria has dimension at least equal to the number of terminal date-events. The equilibrium nominal price level at terminal date-events is arbitrary, irrespective of the interest rate policy by the bank, and it is not even possible to control expected inflation by nominal interest rate policy. We argue that price stickiness implies that this indeterminacy is real.
Our model contains several widely studied general equilibrium models as special cases. This brings up the issue as to how the indeterminacy result is related to equilibrium existence results that have appeared previously in the literature. The standard Arrow-Debreu model corresponds to the case with one time period, one terminal date-event, no price stickiness, and zero interest rates charged by the bank on nominal debt. Such a model has a one-dimensional multiplicity of equilibrium indeed, which is usually suppressed by making use of zero-homogeneity of demand functions to normalize prices. Indeterminacy of equilibrium is entirely nominal.
The standard model of price rigidities as presented in Drèze (1975) corresponds to the case with one time period, one terminal date-event, and zero interest rates charged by the bank on nominal debt. For this model, one-dimensional multiplicity of equilibrium is shown in Herings (1996a) , extending such a result for supply-constrained equilibria in van der Laan (1982) . For a one-period model where some prices are flexible and some are downward rigid, Citanna et al. (2001) find a one-dimensional multiplicity of equilibria that is real.
In a multi-period model of a monetary economy without price stickiness, a model that contains Arrow (1953) as a special case, Drèze and Polemarchakis (2001) find that the dimension of the set of equilibria is equal to the number of terminal date-events, where the multiplicity is entirely nominal. Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005) extend these ideas to a simple fully articulated two-period macroeconomic model, where the multiplicity is real when producers set prices one period in advance.
From a technical point of view, the main complication in our model is a result of the fact that nominal prices are sticky, which implies that nominal commodity prices have to enter the fixed point argument, and that it is not convenient to restrict attention to commodity prices in present-value terms. Since there are no a priori upper bounds on nominal price variables, we consider appropriate limits of economies with compactified price variables. A particular difficulty that has to be addressed is to make sure that the well-known cheaper-point assumption is satisfied in terms of presentvalue prices, both for compactified as for limit economies. Cases where exploding nominal commodity prices are offset by Arrow security prices that converge to zero have to be dealt with carefully.
The indeterminacy result can be understood as a simple consequence of counting equations and unknowns. There are as many markets for commodities and assets as there are instruments to clear them, which would suggest that equilibria are determinate. However, there is a budget constraint at the beginning of each date-event, and there is a budget constraints at the end of each terminal date-event, where each constraint serves as a Walras' law and leads to one additional degree of freedom for equilibrium. Since the policy of the bank consists of setting as many interest rates as there are date-events, each interest rate reducing the degrees of freedom by one due to a no-arbitrage condition on asset prices, we are left with the number of terminal date-events as the dimension of the set of equilibria.
One channel by which indeterminacy of equilibrium could be reduced is suggested in Magill and Quinzii (2014a, b) and consists of introducing additional instruments for the central bank. Another channel would consist of specifying non-Ricardian fiscal policies, where solvency of the fiscal authority implicitly specifies additional equilbrium restrictions and thereby reduces the degrees of freedom. It has been shown in Sims (1994) how this can lead to uniquely determined price levels in a fully articulated macroeconomic model. The macroeconomic literature has emphasized the role of active monetary policy (Leeper 1991) for instance in the form of Taylor rules to obtain determinacy of price levels. At the same time, Benhabib et al. (2001) show that indeterminacy can even result under active interest rate feedback rules. The analysis of equilibrium indeterminacy in a full-fledged general equilibrium model under various assumptions regarding the behavior of the monetary and the fiscal authority features therefore high on the research agenda. As we will argue later, to establish just equilibrium existence under such assumptions in a general setup is far from trivial.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main ingredients of our model-an intertemporal stochastic economy with a general monetary transaction technology and sticky prices-and the concept of sticky price equilibrium. Section 3 explains how the sequence of budget constraints can be replaced by a single budget constraint. Section 4 specifies a fully articulated example and makes a case for the desirability of strictly positive interest rates in an economy with price stickiness and impatient households. It establishes a relation between the rate of impatience of households and the level of welfare optimizing interest rates. Section 5 explicitly lists all assumptions that are needed for a proof of the general indeterminacy result. To study sticky price equilibria, it is helpful to represent the price and rationing in the market of a single commodity by a single parameter, and to define the concept of a parametrized sticky price equilibrium, which is equivalent to but more tractable than the notion of a sticky price equilibrium. This is the topic of Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, we present the main result of the paper about indeterminacy of sticky price equilibria. Section 8 discusses this result and presents the second main result, being that all indeterminacy is real. Section 9 considers potential extensions. Section 10 concludes. The appendix is devoted to a study of the continuity properties of the budget correspondence and the proof of the main theorem in Sect. 7.
The model
We provide a formulation of the new neoclassical synthesis that has the same level of generality as the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. There is an event tree T with the set of date-events S as nodes. The set S is partitioned into subsets S 0 , . . . , S T , where S t consists of the date-events s t in period t. We distinguish between dates and periods, where date t represents the starting point of period t and date t + 1 its end point. We will also refer to date-events s t and periods s t to distinguish between points and intervals of time. There is a unique date-event s 0 at t = 0, the current date-event.
The set of successors of date-event s t is denoted by s + t , a subset of S t+1 . For notational convenience, we introduce a set of date-events S T +1 with the same cardinality as S T . There is a one-one relationship between date-events in S T and those in S T +1 . The related date-event in S T +1 corresponds to the end point of period s T and is the unique element of s
The unique predecessor of s t ∈ S + is denoted by s − t , an element of S t−1 . In each period s t ∈ S there is trade in a finite set L of commodities by households in a finite set H . The price of commodity at date-event s t equals p s t . Among other things, the event tree is used to describe when price adjustments take place. Based on a detailed analysis on the distribution of the frequency of price changes in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) , Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) report that the median frequency of monthly price change across sections in the US economy is 8.7 %, implying that the median duration of a particular price across sectors is around one year. These authors also report considerable heterogeneity in this frequency across sectors. For most commodities, therefore, price adjustments do not take place across periods. As in Debreu (1959) , the event tree is sufficiently refined for all prices to be constant within periods.
At each date-event s t ∈ S, the price of commodity ∈ L is either sticky or can be adjusted. For each ∈ L, this leads to a partition of S consisting of the sets N s and N a . The price of commodity can be adjusted at a date-event s t ∈ N a . If the price of a commodity is flexible, its value will be determined by the forces of supply and demand to achieve market clearing. The set N s consists of those date-events, where the price of commodity is sticky and therefore equals the price in the previous date-event, p s
Notice that, contrary to earlier work in the general equilibrium literature with price rigidities, the value of a commodity with a sticky price is endogenously determined by the first predecessor date-event where the price of this commodity is flexible. When the price of commodity is sticky at date-event s 0 , it is inherited from the price p s −1 set at date-event s −1 , a price that is exogenously given at s 0 . We allow for the case where the price of commodity is flexible at all date-events, in which case N a = S, the case where the price of commodity is fixed at all date-events, N a = ∅, as well as all the intermediate cases. The specification in Taylor (1980) , where prices are sticky for a fixed number of periods, and the specification of Calvo (1983) , where it is determined by chance whether a price can be adjusted, are both obtained as special cases.
Since the price of commodity at date-events in N s is sticky, the markets of these commodities are cleared by quantity adjustments. Violations of voluntary trading are not allowed for. This deviates from part of the macroeconomic literature where quantity adjustments are made by forcing the short side of the market to accommodate the trades desired by the long side. Such an approach is not feasible in our general setup.
In our model, trading on a particular commodity market is not only influenced by the price, but also by the maximal amount a household is able to supply of every commodity, called the rationing scheme on supply, and by the maximal amount a household is able to demand for every commodity, called the rationing scheme on demand. These constraints are imposed on the long side of the market and are determined by the short side. Rationing schemes serve as the matching technology between supply and demand. Since markets are assumed to be fully transparent, rationing affects the long side of the market only.
Rationing can take many forms. For the sake of simplicity, we consider uniform rationing, implying that the rationing scheme on supply is described by z ∈ −R * L S + and the rationing scheme on demand byz ∈ R * L S + , where R * = R ∪ {+∞} denotes the set of extended real numbers. We model the absence of constraints on a particular market s t by setting z s t = −∞ andz s t = +∞, for instance at date-events in N a , where rationing does not take place at equilibrium. The way rationing is modeled is taken from the approach used by Drèze (1975) to study general equilibrium models with real price rigidities, see Herings 1996b for an overview of this literature. In the macroeconomic literature, such an approach is taken for instance in Svensson (1986) . The values of the variables z andz are determined endogenously in an equilibrium.
Price stickiness involves nominal prices. For nominal prices to be meaningful, we need to extend the model by a monetary sector. To a large extent, we follow the monetary sector model of Drèze and Polemarchakis (2001) , a model that is compatible with Chapter 2 of Woodford (2003) , and that can be viewed as its general equilibrium extension. Households hold money for transaction purposes and have a bank loan that is adjusted whenever withdrawels or deposits of money are made.
On top of the real and the monetary part, we assume sequentially complete asset markets, where households trade Arrow securities. Contrary to what is common in the macroeconomic literature, we will not resort to specific functional forms or loglinearizations, but rather consider the actual supply and demand correspondences of commodities, money, and assets under assumptions similar as in the Arrow-Debreu model.
The timing of our model is as follows. A period s t ∈ S starts at date t with transactions on the asset markets and with the bank. Asset market transactions involve buying and selling Arrow securities contingent on future date-events and collecting dividends from the asset portfolio held in the previous period. Households use the proceeds from asset market transactions to adjust holdings of the bank loan and money balances. At dates in the interval (t, t + 1), transactions with other households on the spot markets for commodities take place against money, and transactions with the bank occur exchanging bank loans against money. At date t + 1, period s t terminates with the payment of interest due to the bank and the collection of the bank seignorage by the bank's shareholders. A more detailed account of the monetary part of the model is as follows. At each period s t ∈ S, the bank offers loan facilities to households against a non-negative nominal interest rate r s t , which is allowed to be an arbitrary function of the state s t . . We do allow for the special case where all interest rates are equal to zero. When interest rates are all zero and all prices can be adjusted at all date-events, the monetary part of our model is inessential and our model reduces to Arrow (1953) if, moreover, all prices are flexible at all date-events. (5) = 0. At date 5.2, the household withdraws 2 monetary units from the bank and uses the money to make a purchase with value 2 at date 5.4. The household makes a sale with value equal to 3 monetary units at date 5.6 and brings 1 monetary unit back to the bank at date 5.8. The household makes a purchase with value 2 at date 6. Figure 1 illustrates the development of the bank loan and money balances for this example. The value of the bank loan changes at dates 5.2 and 5.8 when the household transacts with the bank. The amount of money balances held changes at dates 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, and 6. The average bank loan of the household in period s 5 is equal to 1.4 units, so gives rise to interest payments equal to 1.4r s 5 . To keep the example simple, it has been assumed that r s 5 = 0. Otherwise, the value of the bank loan would have been increased by this amount at date 6. Moreover, if the household is a shareholder of the bank, the bank loan is decreased by the household's share in the bank seignorage.
A more detailed account of the asset market part of the model follows next. At date-event s t ∈ S, i.e., at the beginning of period s t , household h has wealth given by the returns from investments in Arrow securities in the previous period a h 
(t). Making use of the property that b h s
, it follows that the monetary holdings minus the bank loan at the end of the previous period equal net sales of commodities in the previous period plus dividends received minus interest payments, m h
Household h invests his wealth at date-event s t in Arrow securities a h s t+1
, where s t+1 ∈ s + t . It follows that household h faces the following sequence of budget constraints,
and the accounting identities 
Substitution of the accounting identities and the lifting-of-indeterminacy identities in the budget constraints eliminates the monetary balances m h s t (t) and bank loan holdings b h s t
(t) and leads to the following reduced form of the budget constraints for household h:
(2.1) 
where for a real-valued vector z we use the notation z + = max{0, z}. 1 Both specifications make the implicit assumption that cash needed for purchases is needed in advance, whereas cash resulting from sales is only available at the end of the period. If, instead, cash resulting from sales is immediately available for purchases, then the natural specification becomes
As in Lucas and Stokey (1987) , we can incorporate the distinction between "cash goods," which are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint, and "credit goods," which do not need to be paid for in cash as would be the case for instance for leisure, and it is entirely possible to make the cash requirements good specific. The transaction technology can be made state-dependent, which enables us to model that the monetary transactions technology is subject to velocity shocks.
The modeling of the transaction technology incorporates a rich variety of other specifications and allows for cases where households have interest elastic money demand as in the Baumol-Tobin model developed independently in Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) . All that is needed is to have one of the commodities representing cashwithdrawal services, the consumption of which diminishes the need for cash balances.
The transaction technology correspondence approach avoids specifications where prices enter the utility function. Utility is derived from the consumption of goods, and the only way money holdings and prices affect utilities is via the commodities that can be purchased.
The description of an economy E = (T , (X
is completed by a specification of ( h ) h∈H , with h the preference relation of household h defined on X h , and a specification of prices p s −1 at date-event s −1 , where only the prices p s −1 for such that s 0 ∈ N s matter.
The monetary part of the model deviates from the treatment in Drèze and Polemarchakis (2001) in two, relatively minor, aspects. The transaction technology there is a correspondence that assigns a set of feasible consumption bundles and bank loans (x h , b h ) to each price system p. In this paper, we assign a set of feasible bank loans b h to each price system and consumption bundle ( p, x h ). A second, more substantial, difference is that we allow bank loans to be negative, which would naturally occur when a household makes many sales in a particular period, resulting in a bank deposit rather than a bank loan.
A household takes prices ( p, q), interest rates r , rationing schemes (−z,z), and dividends v h as given, and chooses a maximal element
, and the sequence of budget constraints (2.1). The budget set γ h ( p, q, r, z,z, v 
We use the notational convention that x is indexed by h ∈ H , ∈ L, and s t ∈ S, b and v are indexed by h ∈ H and s t ∈ S, a is indexed by h ∈ H and s t ∈ S + , p, z and z by ∈ L and s t ∈ S, and q by s t ∈ S + . A household is not necessarily influenced by the constraints on his choices caused by the rationing scheme (z,z) . A household h is constrained on its supply in the market for contingent commodity s t at ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ),x h is strictly preferred to x h . The definition for a household to be constrained on its demand in the market for contingent commodity s t is analogous. There is supply (demand) rationing in the market for contingent commodity s t at ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ) if at least one household is constrained on its supply (demand) in the market for commodity s t at ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ). There is rationing in the market for contingent commodity s t at ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ) if there is supply rationing or demand rationing in the market for commodity s t at ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ).
Definition 2.2 A sticky price equilibrium for the economy
For the sake of simplicity, we have presented a model of a pure exchange economy. It is a routine exercise to extend the model and the sticky price equilibrium concept to a production economy.
Present-value prices
The sequence of budget constraints can be rewritten in a more convenient way. We denote the present-value price at s 0 of one unit of income at date-event s t ∈ {s 0 } ∪ S + by q 0 s t . With s t (s t ) denoting the predecessor of s t at date t, we have It is now straightforward to verify that the original sequence of budget constraints is equivalent to (3.2) plus the recursive system of equations . Positive nominal interest rates create distortions and cause equilibrium marginal rates of substitution of households to differ from one another, thereby leading to absence of Pareto optimality even in the absence of price stickiness.
An example
To get a feel for the model and the equilibrium concept, and to illustrate how the model can be used to analyze the effects of monetary policy on inflation and output, a simple, but fully articulated, example is presented next.
Consider an economy with two households, H = {1, 2}, two periods with no uncertainty, S = {0, 1}, and one commodity per period. The end of period 1 is denoted by 2, so S + = {1, 2}. The price in period 0 is assumed to be flexible and the price in period 1 sticky, N a = {0} and N s = {1}, and consequently, it holds that p 1 = p 0 with p 0 flexible. Initial endowments are e 1 = (1, 0) and e 2 = (0, 1), so household 1 can be thought of as an old household that produces today in exchange for consumption in the future and household 2 as a young household that produces in the future in exchange for consumption today.
The preferences of the households are represented by utility functions u 1 and u 2 defined by
where δ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the common discount factor. It is assumed that cash is needed for net purchases,
The initial endowments are chosen such that household 1 is supplying the good in period 0 and demanding it in period 1, and vice versa for household 2. We can therefore without loss of generality assume that
, and b 2 1 = 0. The bank sets nominal interest rates r 0 and r 1 and issues its entire seignorage as dividends to household 2 at the end of each period, so θ 1 = 0 and θ 2 = 1.
As we have derived in Eq. (3.1), the sequence of budget constraints can be replaced by the single budget constraint
We argue that whenever ( p * , q * , z * ,z * , v * , x * , a * , b * ) is a sticky price equilibrium, it holds that (λp * , q * , z * ,z * , v * , x * , a * , b * ) is a sticky price equilibrium for every positive value of the scalar λ. Indeed, since b h 0 and b h 1 are linear in p 0 and p 1 , respectively, it follows that the budget constraints are homogeneous of degree 1 in prices ( p 0 , p 1 ). The same holds for the transaction technology correspondences. In this example, price stickiness is equivalent to the requirement that p 0 = p 1 , a condition that remains satisfied when all prices are multiplied with a positive scalar. Prices do not enter the utility function. In what follows, we can therefore without loss of generality restrict our attention to sticky price equilibria with ( p * 0 , p * 1 ) = (1, 1). Since there is no uncertainty, the Arrow securities traded on the asset markets reduce to nominal bonds with equilibrium prices pinned down by the no-arbitrage conditions, q 1 = 1/(1 + r 0 ) and q 2 = 1/(1 + r 1 ). We substitute e 1 = (1, 0),
) and obtain the budgets constraints for households 1 and 2, respectively, given by 1 1+r 0
or, equivalently,
If interest rates are positive, the cash-in-advance transaction technology creates a wedge between the prices against which purchases and sales can be made. This becomes apparent from the budget constraints above, where the real relative price of commodity 0 over commodity 1 is equal to 1 for household 1 and equal to
be a sticky price equilibrium. Since the price of commodity 1 is sticky, its market is in general cleared by quantity adjustments. Either household 1 is constrained on the demand of commodity 1, or household 1 is constrained on the supply of this commodity, or we have the degenerate case where no household is constrained.
We first consider sticky price equilibria where household 1 is constrained on the demand of commodity 1 by the rationing schemez * 1 , so x * 1 1 =z * 1 . By market clearing it holds that x * 2 1 = 1 −z * 1 . Since rationing is one-sided in equilibrium by Condition (h) of Definition 2.2, it holds that household 2 is unconstrained, so optimization by household 2 implies that
The budget constraint of household 1 implies that x * 1 0 = 1 −z * 1 . Market clearing of the commodity in period 0 yields
,
.
Sincez * 1 is assumed to be binding, it holds thatz * 1 should be less than the unconstrained demand for commodity 1 by household 1, which equals δ/(1 + δ). A sticky price equilibrium where household 1 is constrained on the demand of commodity 1 therefore results if and only if 1/δ 2 < (1 + r 0 )(1 + r 1 ).
It is now straightforward to compute the equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables. The sticky price equilibrium allocation is given by
At equilibrium, household 1 supplies an amount 1/(1 + δ(1 + r 0 )(1 + r 1 )) of the commodity in period 0, invests the money coming from these sales in Arrow securities a * 1 2 = (1 + r 1 )/(1 + δ(1 + r 0 )(1 + r 1 )) at the beginning of period 1, withdraws money m * 1 1 = 1/(1 + δ(1 +r 0 )(1 +r 1 )) from the bank in order to make purchases in period 1, and in doing so creates a bank loan b * 1 1 = 1/(1 + δ(1 + r 0 )(1 + r 1 )). Household 1 uses m * 1 1 to purchase 1/(1 + δ(1 + r 0 )(1 + r 1 )) units of the commodity in period 1. At the end of period 1, household 1 has to redeem the bank loan plus interest (1 + r 1 )b * 1 1 , which is exactly equal to the proceeds from the Arrow securities.
We next consider sticky price equilibria where household 2 is constrained on his supply of commodity 1 by the rationing scheme z * 1 . It holds that x * 2 1 = 1 + z * 1 . By market clearing we find that x * 1 1 = −z * 1 . Since rationing is one-sided in equilibrium by Condition (h) of Definition 2.2, it holds that household 1 is unconstrained, so optimization by household 1 implies that x * 1 0 = x * 1 1 /δ = −z * 1 /δ. Market clearing of the commodity in period 0 yields x * 2
1 is assumed to be binding, it holds that 1 + z * 1 should exceed the unconstrained demand for commodity 1 by household 2, which equals
Since v * 2 0 = r 0 x * 2 0 = r 0 (δ + z * 1 )/δ and v * 2 1 = r 1 x * 1 1 = −r 1 z * 1 , we can simplify the resulting inequality and find that a sticky price equilibrium where household 2 is constrained on his supply of commodity 1 results if and only if 1/δ 2 > (1+r 0 )(1+r 1 ).
Finally, in case 1/δ 2 = (1+r 0 )(1+r 1 ), the sticky price equilibrium does not involve rationing and the equilibrium allocation is given by x * 1 = (1/(1 + δ), δ/(1 + δ)) and
Observe that in the sticky price equilibria with rationing, the unconstrained demand of the short side of the market determines the amount by which the long side of the market is rationed. When impatience as measured by 1/δ is less than the geometric average of 1 +r 0 and 1 +r 1 , there is too much demand for the commodity in the future period, and the long side of the market, household 1, is constrained in the demand for the commodity in the future period by the supply of household 2. The reverse holds if impatience 1/δ exceeds the geometric average of 1 + r 0 and 1 + r 1 and sticky price equilibria are then characterized by rationing of the supply of household 2 of the future commodity by the demand of household 1.
In case the bank chooses an interest rate policy such that the geometric average of 1 + r 0 and 1 + r 1 is equal to 1/δ, a sticky price equilibrium without rationing results. It is easily verified that this equilibrium weakly Pareto dominates the sticky price equilibria resulting from all other interest rate policies. Intuitively, under sticky nominal prices, interest rate policy can be used to equate real commodity price ratios with the discount factor, which calls for strictly positive interest rates when agents are impatient. On the other hand, choosing higher interest rates increases the wedge between buying and selling prices, which leads to inefficiencies. In the example, as long as (1 + r 0 )(1 + r 1 ) ≤ 1/δ 2 , both effects are exactly equal to each other, and the sticky price equilibria lead to identical utilities for the households. When (1 + r 0 )(1 + r 1 ) exceeds 1/δ 2 , increases in (1+r 0 )(1+r 1 ) lead to lower values ofz * 1 , so more stringent demand rationing of household 1, and lower utilities for both households 1 and 2. In the limit, when the product of 1 + r 0 and 1 + r 1 tends to infinity, there is no supply of commodity 1 by household 2 and all demand of commodity 1 by household 1 is rationed, resulting in the no-trade outcome.
The example has a number of special features. For instance, interest rate policy is (trivially) completely ineffective to control inflation. More surprisingly, it is also completely ineffective to control price levels as it has been shown that all equilibrium prices can be multiplied by a positive scalar λ without affecting the equilibrium. There is a 1-dimensional set of equilibria, where all indeterminacy is nominal. The question is how such conclusions extend to the general model specification with many periods, uncertainty, multiple commodities, all kinds of price stickiness, and general transaction technologies. We will demonstrate that interest rate policy is not effective to control expected inflation and price levels, the degree of indeterminacy is equal to the number of terminal date-events and, under reasonable assumptions, all indeterminacy is real.
Assumptions
The assumptions below are made throughout the paper without further mentioning. 
A1. For h ∈ H,
3. The correspondence β h is positive homogeneous in prices. Consider p,p ∈ R L S + and λ ≥ 0 such thatps t = λps t and, for s t ∈ S\{s t },p s t = p s t . Consider Assumption A4.3 is a standard homogeneity assumption, and A4.4 a standard convexity assumption. In A4.5, we require that when a consumption bundle involves only sales, no bank loan is needed. This is natural, since making the sales should result in a bank deposit rather than a loan. Similarly, for a consumption bundle involving only purchases, non-negative bank loans are required. A4.6 states that additional consumption of a commodity with a zero price does not require additional money balances. 2 A5 requires that all attainable allocations involve non-negative aggregate monetary holdings.
Parametrized prices and rationing schemes
We will not only establish that sticky price equilibria exist, but also that there is an abundance of such equilibria. In fact, we will argue that the set of sticky price equilibria is |S T |-dimensional. To prove this result, it is convenient to choose a suitable parametrization of price and rationing variables. For s t ∈ L × S, we define the set of parameters R s t by
with typical element ρ s t . Next, we define R = s t ∈L×S R s t with typical element ρ.
When s t ∈ N a , supply and demand are equilibrated by the price p s t ∈ R + . We parametrize this price by the variable ρ s t ∈ R + and set p s t (ρ) = ρ s t .
At s t in N s , the market for commodity is equilibrated by one-sided rationing. We will parametrize the relevant rationing schemes by a single parameter ρ s t ∈ [0, 1]. We define z s t (ρ) andz s t (ρ) in such a way that the following properties hold: z s t (ρ) = 0 if ρ s t = 0, at equilibrium ρ may lead to supply rationing in the market for commodity s t only if ρ s t < 1/2, but is irrelevant for supply rationing when ρ s t ≥ 1/2. Similarly, z s t (ρ) = 0 if ρ s t = 1, at equilibrium ρ s t may lead to demand rationing in the market for commodity s t only if ρ s t > 1/2, but is irrelevant for demand rationing when ρ s t ≤ 1/2. The rationing scheme on supply induced by ρ is more negative, so less restrictive for choice, when ρ s t increases; the induced rationing scheme on demand is less positive, so more restrictive for choice, when ρ s t increases. In this way, ρ s t clears markets by means of rationing in a way analogously to a price variable. Low values of ρ s t tend to induce excess demand, and high values of ρ s t tend to induce excess supply, completely analogous to the response of excess demand to the price of a commodity.
We now make the parametrization explicit. Since consumption sets are bounded from below, the market clearing conditions imply that the set of attainable allocations of consumption bundles, the set of x ∈ h∈H X h such that h∈H x h = h∈H e h , is bounded. Letc ∈ R L S + be such that at every attainable allocation the excess consumption x h s t − e h s t of every household h is strictly less thanc s t and strictly more than −c s t . Moreover, we choosec ≥ h∈H (e h − x h ), where x h is a lower bound for X h , which implies that consumption equal toc s t by a single household is not compatible with feasibility of the allocation.
Consider some ρ ∈ R. We define, for ∈ L, for s t ∈ N a ,
In case s 0 ∈ N s , the above definition should be read as requiring p s
Notice that this recursive definition implies p s t (ρ) = ρ s t (s t )
, where s t is a commodity with a sticky price, t is the date where this price is set, and s t (s t ) the prevailing date-event. In case t = −1, it holds that p s t (ρ) = p s −1 . An important observation is that for each commodity s t there is exactly one instrument, parametrized by ρ s t , to clear its market, either a price, or a rationing scheme on supply, or a rationing scheme on demand. The notion of parametrized sticky price equilibrium is more convenient than the one of sticky price equilibrium for a number of reasons. The number of free variables in a parametrized sticky price equilibrium is less than the number in a sticky price equilibrium and is equal to the number of market clearing conditions. None of the equilibrium conditions in a parametrized sticky price equilibrium involves conditionals. All the variables in a parametrized sticky price equilibrium are real numbers; extended real numbers are avoided.
Definition 6.1 A parametrized sticky price equilibrium for the economy E is
The next result shows that a parametrized sticky price equilibrium induces a sticky price equilibrium in a straightforward way. In fact, all that we need to do is to replace supply rationing schemes that are equal to the lower bound −c s t by −∞ and demand rationing schemes equal to the upper boundc s t by +∞. To this end, we define
To show (a), it is sufficient to show that replacing a rationing scheme on supply equal to −c s t by −∞ and a rationing scheme on demand equal toc s t by +∞ is not going to give opportunities to any household h to acquire
on the contrary, there is such a household h and a corresponding (x h , a h , b h
). Since x * is an attainable consumption bundle, it holds that −c
c for λ strictly positive and sufficiently close to zero, and therefore z(ρ
By convexity of h we have that x * h ≺ h λx h + (1 − λ)x * h , which contradicts that 
Conditions (b), (c), (d), and (e) hold trivially.
Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 imply that there is no loss of generality to restrict attention to parametrized sticky price equilibria.
Multiplicity of sticky price equilibria
We show that the degree of multiplicity of sticky price equilibria is |S T | by showing that parametrized sticky price equilibria exist that satisfy |S T | additional restrictions on top of the equilibrium conditions. To make our formulation as simple as possible, we assume that at every terminal date-event s T ∈ S T there is at least one commodity with a flexible price. We select for each date-event s T one such commodity, denoted by 
What is the intuition underlying the results of Theorem 7.1 and Corollary 7.2? Counting equations and unknowns in Definition 6.1 of a parametrized sticky price equilibrium reveals that there are |L||S| commodity market clearing conditions and |L||S| variables ρ s t . Moreover, there are |S + | asset market clearing conditions and |S + | asset prices q s t . There are |S| + |S T | budget constraints in (2.1), leading to |S| + |S T | Walras' laws, inducing |S| + |S T | degrees of freedom for equilibrium. The policy of the bank involves setting |S| interest rates, leading to |S| no-arbitrage conditions in Definition 6.1, reducing the degrees of freedom for equilibrium by |S|, resulting in |S T | degrees of indeterminacy.
One way to lift the |S T | degrees of indeterminacy has been suggested by Magill and Quinzii (2014a, b) in a model without price stickiness. Their suggestion essentially boils down to choosing |S T | additional instruments, in their case by having the bank not only controlling the short-term interest rates, but in addition the interest rates on bonds with longer maturity. Although it is not completely evident that the needed controllability requirements carry over to the sticky price framework, the general principle that more instruments are needed to lower the degree of indeterminacy holds. But since the number |S T | should be thought of as huge, the date-event tree should in principle include all date-events on which agents can condition their actions, the extent to which additional instruments help to reduce nominal and real indeterminacy remains an open issue. The case where all prices are flexible has been studied in Drèze and Polemarchakis (2001) . The absence of imperfections in price formation and the homogeneity assumptions imposed on the transactions technology imply that the whole analysis there can be done in terms of present-value prices. Each equilibrium in terms of present-value prices leads to an S T -dimensional set of equilibria.
Degrees of nominal and real indeterminacy
To illustrate this fact, consider, for the sake of concreteness, an economy with two periods, and let ( p 0 for any λ > 0, which adds one degree of freedom and shows that each equilibrium in terms of present-value prices leads to an S 1 -dimensional set of equilibria. All these equilibria induce the same equilibrium allocation, so there is only nominal indeterminacy and no real indeterminacy of equilibrium in this case.
The same S 1 -dimensional set of equilibria results from Corollary 7.2, though the parametrization chosen there is different. According to Corollary 7.2, one can choose a flexible price commodity (s 1 ) for each date-event s 1 ∈ S 1 , a vector of price levels α ∈ R S 1 ++ , and have an equilibrium with nominal prices given by p (s 1 ) = α s 1 . Although the bank cannot control the price level by interest rate policy, it can control expected inflation. To illustrate this, suppose the economy is stationary, meaning that present-value equilibrium prices are constant up to a discount factor δ,
where π s 1 is the probability of occurrence of state s 1 . We have that the harmonic mean of period one prices is equal to
Expected inflation is equal to δ(1 + r s 0 ). Higher nominal interest rates lead to higher expected inflation. The variance of inflation, however, can be arbitrarily high and is not controlled by the interest rate. Whenever there are two or more date-events in period one, arbitrarily high inflation rates are caused by values of q s 1 arbitrarily close to zero. Since expected inflation is controlled, high inflation in some date-events has to be compensated by low inflation or even deflation in other date-events, as it holds that s 1 ∈S q s 1 = 1/(1 + r s 0 ).
This reasoning extends to the general model with T + 1 periods. These conclusions change when the set of sticky price commodities is non-empty. By Corollary 7.2, there is still an S T -dimensional set of equilibria. However, the route to demonstrate this result via proving the existence of an equilibrium in terms of presentvalue prices and next generating an S T -dimensional set of nominal equilibrium prices by appropriate choices of q and λ is blocked. Multiplications of all prices by λ violates price stickiness if s 0 ∈ ∪ ∈L N s , whereas it can easily happen that no choice for q is consistent with price stickiness. The existence proof of Theorem 7.1 is therefore by means of correspondences that are formulated in terms of nominal prices.
To illustrate the implications of Theorem 7.1 and Corollary 7.2, consider again an economy with two periods, one commodity per date-event, but now a sticky price in period 0, and flexible prices in period 1. By Corollary 7.2 one can choose an arbitrary vector of prices α ∈ R S 1 ++ and have an equilibrium with nominal prices given by p s 1 = α s 1 for s 1 ∈ S 1 . Since the period 0 price is sticky, this result implies that it is not even possible to control expected inflation by nominal interest rate policy. Expected inflation can be arbitrarily high or low, irrespective of nominal interest rates, as the vector α can be arbitrarily chosen.
How are markets equilibrated in such an economy? The equilibrium state prices q s 1 should satisfy s 1 ∈S 1 q s 1 = 1/(1 + r s 0 ) and, since all prices in period 1 are flexible, should be such that at equilibrium present-value prices p 0 s 1 = q s 1 p s 1 there is zero aggregate net trade across future date-events. Relatively high values of α s 1 go together with low prices q s 1 and vice versa. When the vector α has high values across the board, with a sticky price in period 0, the only channel to generate zero intertemporal aggregate trade is demand rationing in period 0. When expected inflation is high and the price in period 0 does not adjust, consumers will face demand rationing in period 0. Vice versa, with low expected inflation, or even expected deflation, a sticky price in period 0 leads to lack of demand and supply rationing in period 0.
In the simple case with one commodity per date-event and a sticky price in period 0, we can generate S 1 − 1 degrees of nominal indeterminacy by an appropriate choice of the asset prices q in the following way. Let ( p 0
) s 1 ∈S 1 ) be present-value equilibrium prices. Since the price in period 0 is assumed to be sticky, it holds that p 0
at unchanged rationing schemes and allocation of commodities, thereby generating S 1 − 1 degrees of nominal indeterminacy. Consider a particular choice for asset prices, sayq ∈ R S 1 ++ satisfying s 1 ∈S 1q s 1 = 1/(1 + r s 0 ), and letp S 1 be the corresponding nominal commodity prices in period 1. For any λ > 0 it holds by Corollary 7.2 that there is a sticky price equilibrium with p S 1 = λp S 1 . Due to the requirement s 1 ∈S 1q s 1 = 1/(1 + r s 0 ), the present-value equilibrium prices corresponding to different values of λ are all distinct. Since p s 0 is sticky, it also holds that price ratios ( p 0
There is a one-dimensional set of equilibria exhibiting real indeterminacy as an increase or a decrease of λ leads on average to overall increases or decreases in present-value prices for future commodities, thereby affecting the budget set.
The general message, however, is that in the presence of price stickiness there are S T degrees of real indeterminacy, so all indeterminacy is real. To show such a result, we make the assumption that at every date-event there is at least one commodity with a sticky price. The next result demonstrates that sticky price equilibria corresponding to different choices for α have present-value prices which are not proportional to each other.
Theorem 8.1
For all s t ∈ S, assume s t ∈ ∪ ∈L N s , and for all s T ∈ S T , assume s T ∈ ∪ ∈L N a . Let L * be a set with one flexible price commodity for each terminal dateevent. Let ( p, q, z,z, v, x, a, b) and (p,q, z ,z ,v,x,ā,b) 
Proof Assume p 0 = λp 0 for some λ ≥ 0. In the sequel, we make repeatedly use of the facts shown in the proof of Theorem 7.1 that according to (11.9) p,p 0 and according to (11.11) q,q 0. Let ∈ L be such that s 0 ∈ N s . We have that , we find that p s t+1 =p s t+1 , which completes the induction step. It follows that α = p L * =p L * =ᾱ, which completes the proof.
Extensions
In a framework like ours, with multiple commodities at each date-event, there is no unique way to define price levels or inflation. We have taken the easiest definition for the price level, which defines the price level at a date-event to be equal to the price of an arbitrarily chosen commodity with a flexible price. A modest generalization would be to go from price levels to "activity" levels, which would naturally be parametrized by the variable ρ. In this case, the arbitrarily chosen commodity might be one with a sticky price, in which case the activity level would correspond to the amount of supply rationing or demand rationing. This seemingly modest extension of Theorem 7.1 and Corollary 7.2 does not hold.
Consider for the sake of simplicity an economy with two periods, zero nominal interest rates, a single date-event in period 1, and one commodity per date-event.
Assume that the price in period 0 is flexible and the price in period 1 is sticky. Stickiness of the price in period 1 coupled with a zero nominal interest rate implies that the presentvalue price of the future commodity is equal to the price of the current commodity. To show the existence of a sticky price equilibrium with ρ s 1 = 1/2, we have to show existence of a sticky price equilibrium with no rationing in the future and, since there is a flexible price in period 0, no rationing in the present. We therefore have to show the existence of an equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu model where the prices of the two arbitrarily chosen commodities are equal to each other. Generically, such an equilibrium does not exist, which proves that Theorem 7.1 and Corollary 7.2 cannot be extended in this way. Still, there is an |S 1 |-dimensional set of equilibria in this example, with a fixed amount of either supply or demand rationing in the market of the commodity at date-event s 1 , parametrized by the price of the commodity at date-event s 0 .
Section 4 presents a concrete example, illustrating the point of the previous paragraph. In that example, given the interest rate policy, the amount of rationing is uniquely determined and all indeterminacy of equilibrium is nominal.
Rather than choosing a commodity with a flexible price for each terminal dateevent, we might choose commodities with a flexible price at intermediate date-events. Such an extension can be proven by the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 7.1, with the obvious modifications.
Rather than choosing a single commodity at terminal date-events, one may define a price level at a terminal date-event, for instance by taking some weighted sum of the prices at that terminal date-event. It follows immediately from Corollary 7.2 that there are sticky price equilibria with arbitrarily high price levels at each terminal date-event.
The interest rate policy by the bank can depend on any exogenous shock as it is an arbitrary function of date-events in S. Since the date-events in S need not be restricted to payoff relevant shocks, the interest rate policy could even depend on sunspots or be random. Our current approach, however, does not allow the interest rate to depend on past endogenous variables. Many papers in the macroeconomic literature have stressed the importance of such interest rate rules, see Woodford (2003) for a detailed discussion of this literature. Since interest rate rules are in general not compatible with the assumption that interest rates are restricted to some compact set, such an extension poses challenging equilibrium existence issues as it is not straightforward how the endogenous variables of the economy should be compactified.
Although the equilibrium existence problem is challenging with interest rate rules, there is no reason to expect that the |S T |-dimensional multiplicity of equilibrium will be lost as a result. The reason is that the imposition of |S| interest rate rules will lead to |S| no-arbitrage conditions, exactly the same as the number of conditions following from our approach with exogenous interest rate policies by the bank. In the macroeconomic literature, this is confirmed by the results in Benhabib et al. (2001) , who show that indeterminacy even results under active interest rate feedback rules like for instance Taylor rules.
Conclusion
We have presented a general equilibrium model that has the same level of generality as the Arrow-Debreu model and that incorporates the main desiderata of the macroeconomic literature known as the new neoclassical synthesis. Agents form rational expectations on prices of commodities and assets, interest rates, supply constraints, and demand constraints, in a stochastically developing multi-period economy. Commodity prices are allowed to be sticky, implying that monetary policy has non-trivial real consequences. At date-events where a commodity price is flexible, it does not adjust mechanically to some measure of disequilibrium, but is set at a market clearing level corresponding to the forces of supply and demand. Since price stickiness involves nominal prices, the model contains a general formulation of the monetary transaction technology.
The main result of the paper is that rational expectations are compatible with an |S T |-dimensional set of equilibria and that in the presence of price stickiness this indeterminacy of equilibrium is real rather than nominal. This poses serious challenges to the issue of how households coordinate their expectations on one particular equilibrium and if they succeed in coordinating their expectations, on which equilibrium that will be. Under strong stationary assumptions and with flexible prices, it might seem natural that they coordinate on an equilibrium where future inflation is deterministic. Without stationary assumptions, and in the presence of price stickiness, such equilibria do generally not exist, and the issue of equilibrium selection becomes even more prominent.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 7.1
How does one prove the existence of a sticky price equilibrium as defined in Definition 2.2? The first problem to be taken care of is a continuity problem. The budget correspondence γ h may fail to be continuous at ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ). To facilitate the study of continuity, we introduce budget correspondencesγ h andγ h next.
It is convenient to introduce the setQ of prices of Arrow securities that are arbitrage-
We define the correspondenceγ h : ( p, q, r, z,z, v h 
The two differences between γ h ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ) andγ h ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ) are the inequality rather than the equality in the budget constraint, and the use of real numbers rather than extended real numbers for rationing schemes. The existence proofs are such that the use of extended real numbers for rationing schemes can be avoided. The inequality in the budget constraint is introduced to ensure thatγ h is non-empty valued. Indeed, by A4, it holds that 0 ∈ β h ( p, e h ). Let a h solve the recursive system of equations (3.3) for b h = 0. Then we have (e h , a h , 0) ∈γ h ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ). The correspondence γ h on the other hand can be empty valued. Empty values for γ h ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ) could for instance occur whenz = 0 and v h is strictly positive.
The correspondenceγ h is a reformulation of the correspondenceγ h in presentvalue terms and omits the determination of the a h variables. The proofs of equilibrium existence require continuity properties of both the correspondencesγ h andγ h , which extend similar continuity properties for non-monetary economies provided in Drèze (1975) and Herings (1996a) . (p, r, z,z,w h 
Lemma 11.1 The correspondenceγ h is lower hemi-continuous and closed at any
We consider two cases, 
So λ h n → 1 and therefore
and lower hemi-continuity ofγ h follows.
Case 2.px h + rb h =pe h +w h and [pz < 0 orw h > 0]. Let α ∈ (0, 1] be such that e h + αz n ∈ X h for all n sufficiently large. Such an α exists since e h ∈ int(X h ), so α can be chosen such that e h + αz ∈ int(X h ), and z n → z. We defineê h n = e h + αz n . For n sufficiently large,ê h n has the following properties,
Sinceê h n ≤ e h it holds by A4.5 that 0 ∈ β h (p n ,ê h n ). For n sufficiently large we havẽ
The strict inequality follows since, for n sufficiently large,pz < 0 impliesp nê h n < p n e h and r n 0 ≤w h n , whereasw h > 0 impliesp nê h n ≤p n e h and r n 0 <w h n . Moreover, when we defineê h = e h + αz, then we have thatê h n →ê h , (p, r, z,z,w h (p, r, z,z,w h ).
The assumptions in Lemma 11.1 are such that for every household there is a consumption bundle in the budget set which is strictly less expensive than the household's total income. This cheaper-point assumption is well known in general equilibrium theory, see Debreu (1959) , and crucial to show lower hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence. A similar assumption is made in Lemma 11.2. ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ( p, q, r, z,z, v h ). The correspondenceγ h is lower hemi-continuous at ( p, q, r, z,z, v 
Lemma 11.2 The correspondenceγ h is lower hemi-continuous and closed at any
We defineâ h n by means of the recursive system of equations (3.3) as determined by ( p n , q n , r n , v h n ) and (x h n ,b h n ). By exactly the same arguments as in the proof of Case 1 of Lemma 11.1 it follows h ( p, x) . The usual continuity arguments imply that
, s t ∈ S\{s 0 }.
It follows that
, where u S ∈ R S is the vector with all components equal to u.
For h ∈ H , we define the compact set b − ∈ R S be a lower bound for the former and b + ∈ R S be an upper bound for the latter set. We define
For h ∈ H , for s t ∈ S, we define A h s t recursively as a compact, convex set containing We define the correspondenceγ h :
The construction of the functions z andz guarantees that any consumption bundle in (ρ, q, v h ). An application of the maximum theorem demonstrates that δ h is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Consider the correspondence ϕ : R× Q×V ×X × A× B → R× Q×V ×X × A× B defined by ϕ (ρ, q, v, x, a, b) (ρ, q, v) , (ρ, q, v, x, a, b) 
where all correspondences involved in the definition of ϕ are defined as the obvious products.
Step 3. Existence of a fixed point. Since the domain of ϕ is a non-empty, compact, and convex set, and ϕ is an upper hemicontinuous convex-valued correspondence, all conditions of Kakutani's fixed point theorem are satisfied. The correspondence ϕ has a fixed point (ρ * , q * , v * , x * , a * , b * ) ∈ μ(x * )×ν(a * )×o(b * )×δ(ρ * , q * , v * ). We define p * = p(ρ * ), z * = z(ρ * ),z * =z(ρ * ), and z * = x * − e. Moreover, we define present-value pricesq * ,p * ,b * ,ṽ * , andw * by setting, for s t ∈ S,q * 
